Achievable Secrecy Rates over MIMOME Gaussian Channels with GMM Signals
  in Low-Noise Regime by Renna, Francesco et al.
ar
X
iv
:1
40
4.
34
11
v1
  [
cs
.IT
]  
13
 A
pr
 20
14
Achievable Secrecy Rates over MIMOME Gaussian
Channels with GMM Signals in Low-Noise Regime
Francesco Renna
Instituto de Telecomunicac¸o˜es
Universidade do Porto
e-mail: frarenna@dcc.fc.up.pt
Nicola Laurenti, Stefano Tomasin
Dipartimento di Ingegneria dell’Informazione
Universita` di Padova
e-mail: {nil, tomasin}@dei.unipd.it
Abstract—We consider a wiretap multiple-input multiple-
output multiple-eavesdropper (MIMOME) channel, where agent
Alice aims at transmitting a secret message to agent Bob, while
leaking no information on it to an eavesdropper agent Eve. We
assume that Alice has more antennas than both Bob and Eve, and
that she has only statistical knowledge of the channel towards
Eve. We focus on the low-noise regime, and assess the secrecy
rates that are achievable when the secret message determines the
distribution of a multivariate Gaussian mixture model (GMM)
from which a realization is generated and transmitted over the
channel. In particular, we show that if Eve has fewer antennas
than Bob, secret transmission is always possible at low-noise.
Moreover, we show that in the low-noise limit the secrecy capacity
of our scheme coincides with its unconstrained capacity, by
providing a class of covariance matrices that allow to attain such
limit without the need of wiretap coding.
Index Terms—multiple-input multiple-output multiple-
eavesdropper (MIMOME) Channels, Secrecy Capacity, Physical
Layer Security.
I. INTRODUCTION
The application of information theoretic secrecy principles
to widely used communication systems is a rising research
topic, in an effort to extend security to the lowest layers.
Seminal works from the ’70s have established the secrecy
capacity of a wiretap channel where agent Alice aims at
transmitting a secret message to agent Bob while not revealing
any information to an eavesdropper agent Eve [1], [2]. Since
then, a number of other scenarios have been investigated,
including the broadcast channel with confidential messages
(BCC) case where multiple receivers require a common mes-
sage and possibly a different secret message each [3], the
case of secret message transmission over parallel channels [4],
[5], fading channels [6] and the multiple-input multiple-output
multiple-eavesdropper (MIMOME) case [7]–[9]. In this paper
we focus on the MIMOME channel which may find many
important applications in wireless communication systems
where the transmitter and the receivers are equipped with
multiple antennas. In particular, we consider the case in which
Alice has perfect knowledge of the channel state information
(CSI) of the legitimate channel, whereas she has access only
to the statistical description of the channel to Eve. A similar
scenario was considered in [10], in which Alice and Bob were
assumed to deploy more antennas than Eve, and achievable
secrecy rates were obtained by using wiretap coding schemes.
In conventional transmission techniques one codeword in a
fixed set (shared among all users) is transmitted by Alice, and
the randomness is due to the noise introduced by the channel
or by possible fading. Here instead we consider the scenario
in which the transmitted codeword is randomly generated
from a continuous set, the secret message determining only
the statistics of the random codeword through a map that
is known to all agents. This approach has been proposed
in [11], where a multiplicative Gaussian wiretap channel is
considered. In that case the transmitted message is a vector
obtained by multiplying a message vector with entries in
{0, 1} by a diagonal matrix with independent zero-mean unit-
variance Gaussian entries. The message vector is assumed to
be sparse (i.e., with many zeros). Assuming that Eve has fewer
observations than Bob through a known and fixed channel
matrix, it is shown that secrecy transmission is possible and
lower and upper bounds to the secrecy capacity are derived,
when Alice has knowledge of both channels.
In this paper we consider a wiretap MIMOME channel
scenario where Alice has only statistical knowledge on the
channel to Eve. Moreover, differently from [11] we do not
restrict the transmitted message to be taken from a binary
sparse distribution but we allow denser discrete signaling. As
a result, the transmitted signal is a Gaussian mixture model
(GMM) multivariate vector, whose statistics must be estimated
by the receiver. Moreover, we carry out our analysis in the
finite-dimension regime, that is, we assume the number of
antennas at Alice, Bob and Eve to be finite. We then focus
on the low-noise regime, characterizing the achievable rate of
this scheme in the absence of noise, where secrecy is provided
by the different channels between the agents. We tailor the
statistics of the message vector to maximize the secrecy rate.
The main results provided by our paper are the following:
1) we devise a system for information-theoretic physical
layer secrecy where the transmitted signal is generated
from one of K different Gaussian distributions with
indices {1, ...,K} and the informative message is the
chosen distribution index;
2) we prove that in the low-noise (or equivalently, high-
signal-to-noise ratio (SNR)) limit, the secrecy rate that
can be achieved by such a system equals the uncon-
strained capacity, logK , even when Alice has only
statistical knowledge of the channel to Eve, and it can be
obtained without resorting to wiretap coding techniques;
3) we derive the GMM parameters that maximize the
secrecy rate achieved by our scheme.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II de-
scribes the system model, providing details on the MIMOME
channel, as well as on the specific transmission procedure.
Section III focuses on the low-noise regime and we obtain
the main results on the achievable rate that can be obtained
with the proposed scheme. Numerical results are presented in
Section IV, before conclusions are outlined in Section V.
Throughout the paper, vectors (resp., matrices), both deter-
ministic and random, are denoted by boldface lowercase (resp.,
uppercase) Latin or Greek letters, while log denotes the base
2 logarithm.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a wireless MIMOME transmission scenario, as
depicted in Fig. 1, in which agent Alice aims at transmitting
to agent Bob a secret message u which must be kept secret to
a third agent Eve. Alice is equipped with n antennas, while
Bob and Eve have mb and me antennas respectively, with
mb,me < n. Between each couple of antennas an additive
white Gaussian noise (AWGN) flat static channel is available,
whose gain does not change for the duration of the entire
transmission. At time t, Alice transmits a column vector x of
n symbols on her antennas, and here we assume that x has real
entries, leaving the extension to complex-valued transmission
for future study. The signal vectors received by Bob and Eve
have dimension mb and me, respectively, and they can be
written as
y = Φbx+wb
z = Φex+we,
(1)
where wb,we ∼ N (0, Iσ2) represent AWGN noise. Matrices
Φb ∈ R
mb×n and Φe ∈ Rme×n, represent the MIMOME
channel. We assume that Alice and Bob know Φb whereas
they have access only to the statistical description of Φe. Eve
is assumed to perfectly know both channel matrices.
We consider an average power constraint on the transmitted
signal
E
[
xTx
]
≤ P. (2)
A. Transmission Technique
We assume that Alice and Bob agree before transmission on
a set of K column vectors of size n, µk, k = 1, . . . ,K , and
K n × n positive semidefinite matrices Σk, k = 1, . . . ,K .
These vectors and matrices are assumed also to be known
to Eve. Then, at each transmission Alice encodes by an
error correcting code the message u into the the message
c ∈ {1, . . . ,K} that is sent by generating vector x at random,
taken from the multivariate normal distribution N (µc,Σc).
Let pk be the probability that message k = 1, . . . ,K is
transmitted. Then the input signal x ∈ Rn follows a GMM
distribution with probability density function (pdf)
px(a) =
K∑
k=1
pkν(a;µk,Σk), (3)
where
ν(a;µk,Σk) =
exp
(
− 12 (a − µk)
T
Σ
−1
k (a− µk)
)
√
(2pi)n detΣk
(4)
is the pdf of a multivariate normal distribution. In other terms,
the input signals are drawn with probability pk from the
Gaussian distribution N (µk,Σk). Let the rank of the input
covariance matrix associated to the k-th Gaussian distribution
be sk = rankΣk, and let smax = maxk sk. The discrete
random variable c corresponding to the choice of the particular
Gaussian input class has alphabet {1, . . . ,K} and probabil-
ity mass function (pmf) {p1, p2, . . . , pK}. Note that, in our
scenario, the information carried by the transmitted signal
is associated with the particular realization of the random
variable c, rather than the actual value of the vector x.
Also, the power constraint can be rewritten now as
E
[
xTx
]
=
K∑
k=1
pk tr(Σk + µkµ
T
k ) ≤ P. (5)
B. Problem Statement
Our objective is to determine the GMM parameters, that is
{pk}, {µk} and {Σk}, that maximize the achievable secrecy
rate. We recall that the supremum on the achievable secrecy
rates, i.e., the secrecy capacity, is given in this case by [3]
Cs = max
(U,c)
[I(y;U)− I(z;U)] , (6)
where U → c → (y, z) form a Markov chain and I(a; b) is
the mutual information between a and b. In fact, the secrecy
capacity (6) is obtained assuming that all agents have perfect
CSI about all channels. When the channel to Eve is known
only statistically by Alice, (6) can be achieved with a given
outage probability [12]. However, we will present in Sec-
tion III a signaling strategy that achieves (6) with I(z; c)→ 0
irrespective of the eavesdropper channel realization.
III. LOW-NOISE REGIME
We focus our analysis on the low-noise regime, i.e., in
the limit σ2 → 0, and we consider the achievable secrecy
rates that are obtained by imposing U = c in (6). We
assume that the number of antennas at Bob are sufficient
to guarantee perfect discrimination among signals coming
from the different Gaussian classes in the low-noise regime.
Namely, we assume
mb > smax, (7)
and assuming also that the shifted range spaces R(Σk) +µk
are all distinct, we have that [13]
lim
σ2→0
Perr(σ
2) = 0, (8)
encoder µc , Σc
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x
Φe
A classifier / decoder B
E
u c
z
y uˆ
MIMOME
channel
Fig. 1. System model. The confidential message u is encoded into the information bearing index c.
where Perr denotes the misclassification probability associated
with the maximum a posteriori (MAP) classifier that estimates
the class from which the input signal x was drawn from the
observation of the measurement vector y. Then, by leveraging
Fano’s inequality [14], we can state that
lim
σ2→0
H(c|y) = 0, (9)
where H(·|·) denotes the conditional entropy, and, therefore,
I(y; c) = H(c) ≤ logK, (10)
where H(c) is the entropy of c and the upper bound in the right
hand side is achieved when pk = 1/K , for k = 1, . . . ,K .
On the other hand, we assume that the legitimate receiver
can leverage an advantage over the eavesdropper in terms of
number of antennas, so that me ≤ smax < mb. Then, consider
the information leaked to the eavesdropper,
I(z; c) = h(z) − h(z|c), (11)
with h(·) denoting the differential entropy. Conditioned on
c = k, the random vector z follows the Gaussian distribution
with mean Φeµk and covariance ΦeΣkΦTe +Iσ2 and we can
write the conditional differential entropy of z given c as
h(z|c) =
K∑
k=1
pk
1
2
log
[
(2pie)me det
(
ΦeΣkΦ
T
e + Iσ
2
)]
. (12)
Moreover, note that also the eavesdropper observation z
follows a GMM distribution
pz(b) =
K∑
k=1
pkν(b;Φeµk,ΦeΣkΦ
T
e + Iσ
2). (13)
Then, we consider the achievable secrecy rate that is ob-
tained by upper bounding the differential entropy of z by
that of a multivariate normal distribution with the same mean
vector and covariance matrix [14]
µz = E [z] =
K∑
k=1
pkΦeµk
Σz = E
[
(z − µz)(z − µz)
T
]
=
K∑
k=1
pkΦe
(
Σk + µkµ
T
k
)
Φ
T
e
−
K∑
k,ℓ=1
pkpℓΦe(µkµ
T
ℓ )Φ
T
e + Iσ
2 (14)
respectively, that is by writing
h(z) ≤ hG (z) =
1
2
log [(2pie)me det (Σz)] . (15)
Therefore, a lower bound to the secrecy rate achieved in this
scenario is
Rs(σ
2) = I(y; c)− hG(z) + h(z|c) (16)
= I(y; c)−
1
2
log [(2pie)me det (Σz)]
+
K∑
k=1
pk
1
2
log
[
(2pie)me det
(
ΦeΣkΦ
T
e + Iσ
2
)]
. (17)
Our aim now is to determine the parameters of the GMM
distribution that maximize the low-noise limit of the achievable
secrecy rate (17)
RLNs = lim
σ2→0
Rs(σ
2)
= H(c)− lim
σ2→0
[hG(z) − h(z|c)] .
(18)
Observe that, in the low-noise regime, the class means µk
affect the values of RLNs only through the term hG(z).
The following Lemma states that using zero-mean classes
maximizes the low-noise achievable secrecy rate.
Lemma 1: Given the positive semidefinite matrix Σz in
(14), it holds
log det(Σz) ≥ log det
(
K∑
k=1
pkΦeΣkΦ
T
e + Iσ
2
)
. (19)
Proof: Consider the difference matrix
∆ = Σz −
(
K∑
k=1
pkΦeΣkΦ
T
e + Iσ
2
)
=
K∑
k=1
pkΦeµk(Φeµk)
T −
K∑
k=1
pkΦeµk
K∑
ℓ=1
pℓµ
T
ℓ Φ
T
e . (20)
Note that ∆ is the covariance matrix of a discrete random
vector taking values in the alphabet {Φeµ1, . . . ,ΦeµK} with
pmf {p1, . . . , pK}, and thus, it is positive semidefinite. Then,
by leveraging Weyl’s Theorem (see Corollary 4.3.3 in [15]),
we can conclude that the ordered eigenvalues of Σz are all
greater or equal than the corresponding ordered eigenvalues
of the matrix on the left hand side of (19), thus proving the
inequality.
On the basis of Lemma 1, we consider secrecy rates
achieved by zero-mean classes, that is, choosing µk = 0, k =
1, . . . ,K . Moreover, on leveraging the convergence properties
of differential entropy due to dominated convergence [16], we
can write the low-noise achievable secrecy rate with zero-mean
classes as
RLNs =H(c)−
1
2
log det
(
K∑
k=1
pkΦeΣkΦ
T
e
)
+
1
2
K∑
k=1
pk log det
(
ΦeΣkΦ
T
e
)
,
(21)
and we can determine the supremum of the secrecy rates
achievable in the low-noise regime.
Theorem 1: The low-noise secrecy capacity associated with
the MIMOME system described in (1) with GMM transmis-
sion and discrete input c ∈ {1, . . . ,K} is given by
CLNs = lim
σ2→0
Cs = logK. (22)
Proof: The converse part of the proof is trivial, and it is
based on the fact that the secrecy capacity is always lower
or equal than the capacity without secrecy constraints, that
implies Cs ≤ maxc I(y; c) ≤ H(c) ≤ logK .
In order to provide the achievability part of the proof, we
observe that there is a sequence of input distributions that
achieves the upper bound logK in the asymptotic low-noise
regime. The existence of such a sequence is guaranteed, in our
scenario, by the fact that, when σ2 → 0, the upper bound in
(17) to I(z; c) is a continuous function of the input covariance
matrices Σk, whereas I(y; c) is not, since (10) holds if the
range spaces R(Σk) are all distinct.
We now define a class of covariance matrices, for which
we will be able to show that I(z; c) → 0. For a given ε ∈ R,
consider the K-classes, zero-mean, GMM vectors obtained by
choosing µk = 0, pk = 1/K and covariance matrices
Σk(ε) =
P
mb − 1
W (ε)k
[
Imb−1 0
0 0
]
[W (ε)k]T, (23)
where W (ε) ∈ Rn×n is an orthogonal matrix obtained
according to the following Cayley transform [17]:
W (ε) = (I −A(ε))(I +A(ε))−1 (24)
from the skew-symmetric matrix
A(ε) =


0 −ε · · · −ε
ε 0 · · · −ε
ε · · ·
.
.
. −ε
ε · · · ε 0

 (25)
Now, it is straightforward to note that
lim
ε→0
W (ε) = I, (26)
and, therefore, when ε→ 0, all the matrices Σk coincide and
the two rightmost terms in (18) cancel out. Then, due to the
continuity of the log-determinant function of positive definite
matrices, we conclude that the supremum of the secrecy rates
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Fig. 2. CDF of the equivocation rates Re with fixed Φb. SNR = 35 dB,
ε = 0.01, 0.005. n = 10, mb = 6 and me = 4, K = 2, 8. The dashed
vertical lines represent the transmission rates Rc.
achieved with this class of covariance matrices, in the low-
noise regime is given by
sup
ε
RLNs (ε) = logK. (27)
It is relevant to observe that the signaling scheme deter-
mined by the input covariance matrices in (23) guarantees
that, asymptotically, I(z; c) → 0 with probability 1 for all
the possible realizations of the eavesdropper channel matrix
Φe. This result has been shown to hold in the low-noise limit
σ2 → 0, thus implying that, for all values σ2 > 0, the mu-
tual information to Eve still asymptotically approaches zero,
since adding noise decreases the quality of communication.
Therefore the proposed scheme provides secrecy even without
the knowledge of the eavesdropper channel and, most notably,
without requiring the use of wiretap codes. In fact, error
correcting coding only can be used and secrecy is obtained
directly by leveraging the fact that the mutual information at
the eavesdropper can be reduced asymptotically to zero by
tuning the parameter ε. Moreover, in the low-noise regime,
such scheme achieves the secrecy capacity logK .
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In the previous sections, we have described a transmission
strategy which achieves a secrecy rate equal to logK in
the low-noise regime without the need of wiretap coding. In
this section, we focus on finite SNR values, assessing the
equivocation rate [18]
Re = [I(y; c) − I(z; c)]
+ . (28)
We consider an error correcting code with rate Rc = I(y; c)
and recall that, when the equivocation rate Re is equal to the
transmission rate Rc, then we have perfect secrecy [1]. We set
n = 10, mb = 6 and me = 4, respectively.
Fig. 2 shows the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of
the equivocation rates obtained when the legitimate channel
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Fig. 3. CDF of the rate Re/Rc (solid lines) and of the ratio RH/Rc (dashed
lines). SNR = 25 dB. n = 10, mb = 6 and me = 4, K = 2 and ε =
0.1, 0.05, 0.01, 0.005.
matrix Φb contains the first mb rows of an n-dimensional dis-
crete cosine transform (DCT) matrix, whereas the eavesdrop-
per channel matrices are randomly generated with independent
identically distributed (i.i.d.) zero-mean, unit-variance, Gaus-
sian entries. The SNR is equal to 35 dB, the numbers of classes
of the transmitted signals are K = 2 and K = 8, and ε = 0.01
and ε = 0.005. We also report the value of the secrecy rate
RH that is achieved by the wiretap coding scheme described
in [10]. We can notice that, when K = 2, our scheme provides
a much lower equivocation rate than the secrecy rate of [10].
Moreover, on increasing the number of transmitted classes to
K = 8, higher equivocation rates are achieved than the secrecy
rate of [10], at the expense of a higher information leakage
towards Eve.
We then consider the case in which also Φb is generated at
random with i.i.d., zero-mean, unit-variance Gaussian entries.
Alice is assumed to know the current realization of the legit-
imate channel coefficients, and she could arguably optimize
the values of K and ε to maximize the equivocation rate
under a given constraint on the probability that the leakage to
the eavesdropper overcomes a given threshold. Nevertheless,
we assess approximately the performance of the system by
considering the case in which K = 2, SNR = 25 dB, and by
choosing ε = 0.1, 0.05, 0.01, 0.005. Fig. 3 shows the CDF
of Re/Rc, i.e., the secure fraction of the transmitted rate.
For comparison, we also report the CDF of RH/Rc, where
Rc is still the code rate of our scheme. We observe that, by
taking ε ≤ 0.01, only the 20% of the channel realizations
correspond to information leakages to Eve that are larger than
the 10% of the transmitted rate. Moreover, for such values of
ε, the transmission rate guaranteed by our scheme is higher
than the secrecy rate of [10] for the large majority of channel
realizations.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have studied secrecy rates achievable over
a MIMOME channel when the transmitted signals are drawn
from a K-classes GMM distribution, with the information
encoded into the index of the chosen Gaussian class. In
particular, we have considered the case in which the legitimate
user can deploy more antennas than the eavesdropper but they
have only statistical knowledge of the channel to Eve, and
we have studied the achievable secrecy rates in the low-noise
regime.
We have proved that, also when the number of antennas
deployed by all the nodes in the network is finite, the low-noise
secrecy capacity of this system is given by the unconstrained
capacity logK . We have also described a class of GMM
distributions which achieve the low-noise secrecy capacity
by nulling the mutual information at the eavesdropper, thus
without the need of wiretap codes.
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